kant - prolegomena-752, książki, Philosphy
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Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics(1783)Immanuel KantCopyright 1997, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See endnote fordetails on copyright and editing. The following is based on PaulCarus's 1902 translation of the Prolegomena. Spelling has beenAmericanized. A few of Lewis White Beck's conventions have beenadopted from his revision of Carus's translation, such asreplacing the word "cognise" with "knowledge."1Contents:Introduction.Preamble On The Peculiarities Of All Metaphysical Cognition.First Part Of The Transcendental Problem: How Is PureMathematics Possible?Second Part Of The Transcendental Problem: How Is TheScience Of Nature Possible?Third Part Of The Main Transcendental Problem: How IsMetaphysics In General Possible?Conclusion: On The Determination Of The Bounds Of PureReason.Solution Of The General Question Of The Prolegomena: "HowIs Metaphysics Possible As A Science?"Appendix: On What Can Be Done To Make Metaphysics Actual AsA Science.* * * *INTRODUCTION.These Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils,but of future teachers, and even the latter should not expectthat they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of aready-made science, but merely for the discovery of the scienceitself.There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy(both ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these thepresent Prolegomena are not written. They must wait till thosewho endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself havecompleted their work; it will then be the historian's turn toinform the world of what has been done. Unfortunately, nothingcan be said, which in their opinion has not been said before, andtruly the same prophecy applies to all future time; for since thehuman reason has for many centuries speculated upon innumerableobjects in various ways, it is hardly to be expected that weshould not be able to discover analogies for every new idea amongthe old sayings of past ages.My object is to persuade all those who think Metaphysicsworth studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause amoment, and, neglecting all that has been done, to propose firstthe preliminary question, 'Whether such a thing as metaphysics beat all possible?'If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like othersciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition ? If not,how can it maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind insuspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whetherthen we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field,we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting thenature of this so-called science, which cannot possibly remain onits present footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while everyother science is continually advancing, that in this, whichpretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle every oneinquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, withoutgaining a single step. And so its followers having melted away,we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in othersciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody,however ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict,as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measureto distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk.After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration ofa science, when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, thatthe question should at last occur, whether and how such a scienceis possible? Human reason so delights in constructions, that ithas several times built up a tower, and then razed it to examinethe nature of the foundation. It is never too late to becomewise; but if the change comes late, there is always moredifficulty in starting a reform.The question whether a science be possible, presupposes adoubt as to its actuality. But such a doubt offends the men whosewhole possessions consist of this supposed jewel; hence he whoraises the doubt must expect opposition from all sides. Some, inthe proud consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient,and therefore considered legitimate, will take their metaphysicalcompendia in their hands, and look down on him with contempt;others, who never see anything except it be identical with whatthey have seen before, will not understand him, and everythingwill remain for a time, as if nothing had happened to excite theconcern, or the hope, for an impending change.Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independentreader of these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previousscience, but ultimately be fully persuaded, that it cannot existunless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends,be satisfied; and, as this has never been done, that there is, asyet, no such thing as Metaphysics. But as it can never cease tobe in demand,2 -- since the interests of common sense areintimately interwoven with it, he must confess that a radicalreform, or rather a new birth of the science after an originalplan, are unavoidable, however men may struggle against it for awhile.Since the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since theorigin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing hasever happened which was more decisive to its fate than the attackmade upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on this species ofknowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from which light mighthave been obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance andhad its smoldering fire been carefully nursed and developed.Hume started from a single but important concept inMetaphysics, viz., that of Cause and Effect (including itsderivatives force and action, etc.). He challenges reason, whichpretends to have given birth to this idea from herself, to answerhim by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, thatif that thing be posited, something else also must necessarily beposited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. Hedemonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible forreason to think a priori and by means of concepts a combinationinvolving necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence ofthe existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, orhow the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. Hencehe inferred, that reason was altogether deluded with reference tothis concept, which she erroneously considered as one of herchildren, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard ofimagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certainrepresentations under the Law of Association, and mistook thesubjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arisingfrom insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to thinksuch, combinations, even generally, because her concepts wouldthen be purely fictitious, and all her pretended a prioricognitions nothing but common experiences marked with a falsestamp. In plain language there is not, and cannot be, any suchthing as metaphysics at all.3However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, itwas at least founded upon investigation, and this investigationdeserved the concentrated attention of the brighter spirits ofhis day as well as determined efforts on their part to discover,if possible, a happier solution of the problem in the senseproposed by him, all of which would have speedily resulted in acomplete reform of the science.But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, ofnot being understood. It is positively painful to see bow utterlyhis opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley,missed the point of the problem; for while they were ever takingfor granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zealand often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting,they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everythingremained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened.The question was not whether the concept of cause was right,useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, forthis Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could bethought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessedan inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a widerapplication than merely to the objects of experience. This wasHume's problem. It was a question concerning the origin, notconcerning the indispensable need of the concept. Were the formerdecided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its validapplication would have been determined as a matter of course.But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponentsof the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into thenature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking,-atask which did not suit them. They found a more convenient methodof being defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to commonsense. It is indeed a great gift of God, to possess right, or (asthey now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense mustbe shown practically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughtsand words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rationaljustification can be advanced. To appeal to common sense, wheninsight and science fail, and no sooner-this is one of the subtlediscoveries of modern times, by means of which the mostsuperfi...
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