hume - of-740, książki, Philosphy
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[TABLE NOT SHOWN][TABLE NOT SHOWN]Copyright 1997, Julie Van Camp (jvancamp@csulb.edu). See end note fordetails on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft;please report errors.[1]Editor's note: " Of the Standard of Taste" appeared in 1757 in Hume'sFour Dissertations. The text file here is based on the 1875 Green andGrose edition of Hume's Writings. Spelling and punctuation have notbeen modernized.---------------------------------------------------------------------Of the Standard of TasteThe great variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, whichprevails in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen underevery one's observation. Men of the most confined knowledgeare able to remark a difference of taste in the narrow circleof their acquaintance, even where the persons have beeneducated under the same government, and have early imbibed thesame prejudices. But those, who can enlarge their view tocontemplate distance nations and remote ages, are still moresurprised at the great inconsistence and contrariety. We areapt to call barbarous whatever departs widely from our owntaste and apprehension: But soon find the epithet of reproachretorted on us. And the highest arrogance and self-conceit isat last startled, on observing an equal assurance on allsides, and scruples, amidst such a contest of sentiment, topronounce positively in its own favour.As this variety of taste is obvious to the most carelessenquirer; so will it be found, on examination, to be stillgreater in reality than in appearance. The sentiments of menoften differ with regard to beauty and deformity of all kinds,even while their general discourse is the same. There arecertain terms in every language, which import blame, andothers praise; and all men, who use the same tongue, mustagree in their application of them. Every voice is united inapplauding elegance, propriety, simplicity, spirit in writing;and in blaming fustian, affectation, coldness and a falsebrilliancy: But when critics come to particulars, this seemingunanimity vanishes; and it is found, that they had affixed avery different meaning to their expressions. In all matters ofopinion and science, the case it opposite: The differenceamong men is there oftener found to lie in generals than inparticulars; and to be less in reality than in appearance. Anexplanation of the terms commonly ends the controversy; andthe disputants are surprised to find, that they had beenquarreling, while at bottom they agreed in their judgment.Those who found morality on sentiment, more than on reason,are inclined to comprehend ethics under the formerobservation, and to maintain, that, in all questions, whichregard conduct and manners, the difference among men is reallygreater than at first sight it appears. It is indeed obvious,that writers of all nations and all ages concur in applaudingjustice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity; and inblaming the opposite qualities. Even poets and other authors,whose compositions are chiefly calculated to please theimagination, are yet found, from HOMER down to FENELON, toinculcate the same moral precepts, and to bestow theirapplause and blame on the same virtues and vices. This greatunanimity is usually ascribed to the influence of plainreason; which, in all these cases, maintains similarsentiments in all men, and prevents those controversies, towhich the abstract sciences are so much exposed. So far as theunanimity is real, this account may be admitted assatisfactory: But we must also allow that some part of theseeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the verynature of language. The word virtue, with its equivalent inevery tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does blame: Andno one, without the most obvious and grossest impropriety,could affix reproach to a term, which in general acceptationis understood in a good sense; or bestow applause, where theidiom requires disapprobation. HOMER's general precepts, wherehe delivers any such will never be controverted; but it isobvious, that, when he draws particular pictures of manners,and represents heroism in ACHILLES and prudence in ULYSSES, heintermixes a much greater degree of ferocity in the former,and of cunning and fraud in the latter, than FENELON wouldadmit of . The same ULYSSES in the GREEK poet seems to delightin lies and fictions; and often employs them without anynecessity of even advantage: But his more scrupulous son, inthe FRENCH epic writer, exposes himself to the most imminentperils, rather than depart from the most exact line of truthand veracity.The admirers and follows of the ALCORAN insist on theexcellent moral precepts interspersed throughout that wild andabsurd performance. But it is to be supposed, that the ARABICwords, which correspond to the ENGLISH, equity, justice,temperance, meekness, charity, were such as, from the constantuse of that tongue, must always be taken in a good sense; andit would have argued the greatest ignorance, not of morals,but of language, to have mentioned them with any epithets,besides those of applause and approbation. But would we know,whether the pretended prophet had really attained a justsentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and weshall soon find, that he bestows praise on such instances oftreachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as areutterly incompatible with civilized society. No steady rule ofright seems there to be attended to; and every action isblamed or praised, so far only as it is beneficial or hurtfulto the true believers.The merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics isindeed very small. Whoever recommends any moral virtues,really does no more than is implied in the terms themselves.That people, who invented the word charity, and use it in agood sense, inculcated more clearly and much moreefficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretendedlegislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in hiswritings. Of all expressions, those, which, together withtheir other meaning, imply a degree either of blame orapprobation, are the least liable to be perverted or mistaken.It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, bywhich the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; atleast, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, andcondemning another.There is a species of philosophy, which cuts off all hopes ofsuccess in such an attempt, and represents the impossibilityof ever attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it issaid, is very wide between judgment and sentiment. Allsentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference tonothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man isconscious of it. But all determinations of the understandingare not right; because they have a reference to somethingbeyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are notalways conformable to that standard. Among a thousanddifferent opinions which different men may entertain of thesame subject, there is one, and but one, that is just andtrue; and the only difficulty is to fix and ascertain it. Onthe contrary, a thousand different sentiments, excited by thesame object, are all right: Because no sentiment representswhat is really in the object. It only marks a certainconformity or relation between the object and the organs orfaculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not reallyexist, the sentiment could never possibly have being. Beautyis no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in themind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives adifferent beauty. One person may even perceive deformity,where another is sensible of beauty; and every individualought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending toregulate those of others. To seek in the real beauty, or realdeformity, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend toascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to thedisposition of the organs, the same object may be both sweetand bitter; and the proverb has justly determined it to befruitless to dispute concerning tastes. It is very natural,and even quite necessary to extend this axiom to mental, aswell as bodily taste; and thus common sense, which is so often...
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