hume - letter-741, książki, Philosphy
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[TABLE NOT SHOWN][TABLE NOT SHOWN]Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note fordetails on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft;please report errors.1Editor's note: In 1744-1745 Hume was a candidate for the Chair ofMoral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. The position was tobe vacated by John Pringle, and the leading candidates were Hume andWilliam Cleghorn. The Edinburgh Town Council was responsible forelecting a replacement; consequently, politics was a key factor in thedecision. Loyalties were drawn chiefly along the two key politicalparty lines: the Argathelians (Hume's party), and the Squadrones(Cleghorn's party). Pringle, a Squadrone, procrastinated in steppingdown, thus allowing the Squadrones to unify their opposition to Humeby condemning his anti-religious writings. Chief among the religiouscritics was clergyman William Wishart (d. 1752), the Principal of theUniversity of Edinburgh. Although Wishart was an Argathelian, hisdislike of Hume's philosophy rose above political allegiance; it isalso relevant that Wishart too sought the position for which Hume wasapplying. Lists of allegedly dangerous propositions from Hume'sTreatise circulated, presumably penned by Wishart. In the face of suchstrong opposition, Hume's Argathelian support weakened. The religiousdimension of the competition also compelled the Edinburgh Town Councilto consult the Edinburgh ministers. Hoping to win over the clergy,Hume composed a point by point reply to the circulating lists ofdangerous propositions. This was sent to Henry Home, and published asA Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh. The clergy werenot dissuaded, and 12 of the 15 ministers voted against Hume. Humequickly withdrew his candidacy. A month later Hume reflected in aletter that the matter of his vocational opportunities "was brought toan issue, and by the cabals of the Principal [i.e. Wishart], thebigotry of the clergy, and the credulity of the mob, we lost it." In1751-1752 Hume sought a philosophy chair at the University of Glasgow,and was again unsuccessful. Hume's lesson, perhaps, was to seek civilemployment through his Argathelian supporters, rather than academicemployment. The following is from the 1745 edition of A Letter from aGentleman.---------------------------------------------------------------------A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN TOHIS FRIEND IN Edinburgh:CONTAININGSome OBSERVATIONS ONA Specimen of the Principles concerning RELIGION and MORALITY,said to be maintain'd in a Book lately publish'd, intituled, ATreatise of Human Nature, &c.EDINBURGH,Printed in the year M.DCC.XLV.---------------------------------------------------------------------{3}SIR,I Have read over the Specimen of the Principles concerning Religionand Morality, said to be maintain'd in a Book lately published,intituled, A Treatise of Human Nature; being an Attempt to introducethe Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. I have alsoread over what is called the Sum of the Charge. Which Papers, as youinform me, have been industriously spread about, and were put intoyour hands some few Days ago.I was perswaded that the Clamour of Scepticism, Atheism, &c.had been so often employ'd by the worst of Men against thebest, that it had now lost all its Influence; and should neverhave thought of making any Remarks on these maim'd Excerpts,if you had not laid your Commands on me, as a piece of commonJustice to the Author, and for undeceiving some well-meaningPeople, on whom it seems the enormous Charge has madeImpression. {4}I shall insert the Accusation at full Length, and then goregularly through what is called the Sum of the Charge;because it is intended, I suppose, to contain the Substance ofthe whole. I shall also take notice of the Specimen as I goalong.Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality, &c.THE Author puts on his Title-page (Vol. I printed for J. Noon, 1739) aPassage of Tacitus to this Purpose; "Rare Happiness of our Times, thatyou may think as you will, and speak as you think."He expresses his Deference to the Publick in these Words(Advertisement, p. 2.) The Approbation of the Publick Iconsider as the greatest Reward of my Labours; but amdetermined to regard its Judgment, whatever it be, as my bestInstruction."He gives us the summary View of his Philosophy from p. 458. to470. --"I am confounded with that forlorn Solitude, in which I amplaced in my Philosophy. {5} -- I have exposed myself to theEnmity of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathematicians, andeven Theologians. -- I have declared my Disapprobations oftheir Systems. -- When I turn my Eye inward, I find nothingbut Doubt and Ignorance. All the World conspires to oppose andcontradict me; tho' such is my Weakness, that I feel all myOpinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported bythe Approbation of others. -- Can I be sure, that, in leavingall established Opinions, I am following Truth? and by whatCriterion shall I distinguish her, even if Fortune should atlast guide me on her Footsteps? After the most accurate andexact of my Reasonings, I can give no Reason why I shouldassent to it; and feel nothing but a strong Propensity toconsider Objects strongly in that View under which they appearto me. -- The Memory, Senses, and Understanding, are all ofthem founded on the Imagination. -- No Wonder a Principle soinconstant and fallacious should lead us into Errors, whenimplicitely followed (as it must be) in all its Variations. --I have already shown, that the Understanding, when it actsalone, and according to its most general Principles, entirelysubverts itself, and leaves {6} not the lowest Degree ofEvidence in any Proposition either in Philosophy or commonLife. -- We have no Choice left, but betwixt a false Reasonand none at all. -- Where am I, or what? From what Causes do Iderive my Existence, and to what Condition shall I return?Whose Favour shall I court, and whose Anger must I dread? WhatBeings surround me? On whom have I any Influence, or who haveany Influence on me? I am confounded with all these Questions,and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable Conditionimaginable, invironed with the deepest Darkness, and utterlydeprived of the Use of every Member and Faculty. -- If I mustbe a Fool, as all those who reason or believe any Thingcertainly are, my Follies shall at least be natural andagreeable. -- In all the Incidents of Life, we ought still topreserve our Scepticism: If we believe that Fire warms, orWater refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much Painsto think otherwise; nay, if we are Philosophers, it ought onlyto be upon sceptical Principles. -- I cannot forbear having aCuriosity to be acquainted with the Principles of moral Goodand Evil, &c. I am concerned for he Condition of the learnedWorld, which lies under such a deplorable {7} Ignorance in allthese Particulars. I feel an Ambition arise in me ofcontributing to the Instruction of Mankind, and of acquiring aName by my Inventions and Discoveries. -- Should I endeavourto banish these Sentiments, I feel I should be a Loser inpoint of Pleasure; and this is the Origin of my Philosophy."Agreeable to this summary View, he tells us, p. 123."Let us fix our Attention out of ourselves as much aspossible. -- We really never advance a Step beyondourselves; nor can conceive any Kind of Existence, butthese Perceptions which have appeared in that narrowCompass: This is the Universe of the Imagination, nor havewe any Idea but what is there produced."Accordingly,"An Opinion or Belief may be most accurately defined, A livelyIdea related or associated with a present Impression; and is moreproperly an Act of the sensitive than of the cognitive Part of ourNatures."And,"Belief in general consists in nothing but the Vivacity of anIdea. Again, the Idea of Existence is the very same with the Ideaof what we conceive to be existent. -- Any Idea we please to formis the Idea of a Being; and the Idea of a Being is any Idea weplease to form. And as to the {8} Notion of an external Existence,when taken for something specifically different from ourPerceptions, we have shown its absurdity: And what we call a Mindis nothing but a Heap or Collection of different Perceptionsunited together by certain Relations, and supposed, tho' falsly,to be endowed with a perfect Simplicity."And,"The only Existence, of which we are certain, are Perceptions.When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I alw...
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